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1241 
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PRIVACY WITH RESPECT 
TO BANK RECORDS IN CRIMINAL CASES 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
 NEW YORK COUNTY 
People v. Lomma1 
(decided February 1, 2012) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In People v. Lomma, the court held that the defendant had no 
standing to move to quash the People’s subpoena for his personal 
banking records in a criminal proceeding.2  The Supreme Court of 
New York County based its decision on state precedent and the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court’s seminal decision of United States v. Mil-
ler.3  In Miller, the Court held that a criminal defendant did not have 
a Fourth Amendment interest in his banking records.4  The court in 
Lomma followed a similar rationale as this issue is slowly evolving 
and New York has not yet given a criminal defendant a Fourth 
Amendment interest in his or her personal bank records.  The court 
reasoned that given the contemporary use of technology and wide-
spread use of online banking that requires users to create passwords, 
bankers should reasonably believe that a level of privacy exists to a 
certain extent.5  The court emphasized in its decision that a defendant 
“should have a right to move to quash a subpoena duces tecum issued 
to a third-party bank for his personal banking records.”6  However, 
the court noted it was “obviously” bound to follow New York State 
 
1 937 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 2012). 
2 Id. at 842-43. 
3 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
4 Id. at 445. 
5 Lomma, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 841. 
6 Id. at 841. 
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law that was in effect at the time it rendered its decision.7  Adhering 
to state precedent, the court ultimately found that a banker’s right to 
privacy with respect to their personal banking records is not some-
thing that has yet to be recognized by New York State laws.8  There-
fore, the defendant in Lomma had no standing to move to quash a 
subpoena issued for his personal bank records in connection with an 
ongoing criminal case.9 
This Note addresses individuals’ rights with respect to their 
personal bank records.  By analyzing both the federal and New York 
State approach to this issue, many readers will be surprised to learn 
that their bank records held by financial institutions in New York are 
not as secure and confidential as they may suspect them to be.  While 
the federal government has passed a statute granting individuals lim-
ited privacy rights to their bank records, the federal statute does not 
apply to state government investigations or criminal prosecutions.10  
The final section of this Note provides a suggestion on how New 
York should adopt similar measures taken by the federal government 
and several others states.  New York State should look to construe its 
constitution to afford individuals more privacy rights to protect the 
sensitive information contained in their bank records or adopt a stat-
ute that does so. 
II. THE OPINION 
In People v. Lomma, the defendant owned a crane in May 
2008, which collapsed while a worker on East 91st Street in Manhat-
tan was operating it.11  The collapse resulted in the death of the crane 
operator, a man working on the street below, and also seriously in-
jured a third person.12  The defendant, James Lomma, was the princi-
pal of the company, J.F. Lomma, Inc., which owned the crane that 
caused the accident.13  Lomma was charged with manslaughter as a 
 
7 Id. at 842. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 See Right to Financial Privacy, 12 U.S.C. § 3401(3) (2012). 
11 Lomma, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 834.  There were several other defendants that were charged 
with similar crimes including the owner of the crane, New York Crane and Equipment Cor-
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result of the crane collapsing.
 14  There were also several other de-
fendants involved in the incident who faced similar charges.15 
Prosecutors alleged that the collapse of the crane was the di-
rect result of faulty repairs made by the defendant in conveniently or-
dering a replacement part for the crane from a company in China 
merely for the purpose of saving time and money.16  According to the 
People, this subpar repair to a “critical part” of the machine led to the 
collapse of the crane.17  The People subpoenaed Citibank to request 
the defendant’s personal financial records for a seven month period 
because the prosecution planned to argue that the defendant’s faulty 
repairs were motivated by the defendant’s desire to save money.18 
In issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the defendant’s bank 
records in Lomma, the People failed to provide any notice or make 
defendant aware of the subpoena that had been issued.19  However, 
this point is moot because the court later established that the defend-
ant did not have the requisite standing required to challenge the sub-
poena, thus receiving notice of the subpoena would not have served 
much of a purpose for the defendant.20  Nevertheless, once the de-
fendant had learned that a subpoena had been issued for his bank rec-
ords to a third-party, he moved to quash that subpoena.21  Lomma had 
two central arguments in support of his view that the motion should 
be quashed.22  His first argument was that the prosecution failed to 
inform him of the subpoena that had been issued regarding his per-
sonal accounts to Citibank.23  The second was that the subpoena that 
had been issued “was not calculated to obtain relevant evidence” and 
should not have been granted.24  Accordingly, the defendant’s second 
 
14 Id. 
15 See Lomma, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 834 (“A fourth defendant, Tibor Varganyi, New York 
Crane’s head mechanic, previously pleaded guilty to Criminally Negligent Homicide and is 
awaiting sentence.”). 
16 Id. at 834-35. 
17 Id. at 835. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 834. 
20 Lomma, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 842. 
21 Id. at 834. 
22 Id. 
23 Id.  In response to the first issue raised by the defendant, the court stated that there was 
no argument to be made that the New York Legislature was incorrect when it provided par-
ties in civil cases with more due process rights than criminal defendants.  Id. at 839.  There-
fore, the court held, “Parties in criminal cases are not entitled to notice when a subpoena 
duces tecum is served on a third party.”  Lomma, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 839. 
24 Id. at 834. 
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argument, that the subpoenaed records were not relevant to his crimi-
nal charges, required him to have standing or a recognized right in 
the bank records in order to be able to challenge the relevancy of the 
records. 
The central issue in Lomma was whether an individual, claim-
ing a right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment, had standing to 
challenge a third party subpoena for personal bank records.25  The 
test to determine whether an individual has standing is “whether the 
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or 
of particular issues.”26  The standing doctrine requires that a plain-
tiff’s complaint “fall within the zone of interests protected by the law 
invoked.”27 
First, the court in Lomma expressed its disappointment with 
the current state of the law in New York regarding notice and stand-
ing with respect to subpoenas for a party’s bank records by stating: 
A party to a criminal proceeding, in the Court’s view, 
should certainly be entitled to know if an opposing 
party has subpoenaed his personal financial records.  
Defendants in a criminal proceeding should also have 
a right to be heard when their personal financial rec-
ords are sought.  The fact that New York still has no 
clear rules which provide for either such notice or 
standing, in the Court’s view, wrongfully deprives de-
fendants of significant due-process rights which would 
be easy to implement and result only in the opportuni-
ty for a neutral magistrate to review whether a sub-
poena duces tecum had been lawfully issued.28 
Notwithstanding the court’s opinion that the law should pro-
tect an individual’s bank records,29 it was still bound to follow New 
York precedent.  Therefore, the court in Lomma held that “the de-
fendant has no standing to move to quash the People’s subpoena to 
Citibank.”30 
 
25 Id. at 839. 
26 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984). 
27 Id. at 751. 
28 Lomma, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 843. 
29 See id. at 841 (“In the view of this Court, a party, whether in a civil or a criminal pro-
ceeding, should have a right to move to quash a subpoena duces tecum issued to a third-party 
bank for his personal banking records.”). 
30 Id. at 842. 
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III. FEDERAL PRECEDENT 
A. Generally  
The court’s decision in Lomma was based largely on the sem-
inal Supreme Court decision of United States v. Miller.31  The focus 
of the Supreme Court’s analysis was whether a defendant had stand-
ing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge such subpoenas.32  In 
Miller, the Supreme Court held that there is no Fourth Amendment 
protection unless any government investigation intrudes into a zone 
of privacy.33  The Court described the zone of privacy as “the security 
a man relies upon when he places himself or his property within a 
constitutionally protected area.”34  As will be explained below, while 
the Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right to pri-
vacy with respect to personal bank records, federal legislation has 
been adopted to provide bank customers with some protection. 
Miller involved a defendant who was facing charges for pos-
session of an unregistered still, and other related charges for attempt-
ing to defraud the United States Government by not paying whiskey 
taxes.35  The defendant made a pretrial motion to suppress bank rec-
ords, which included “checks and other bank records” related to his 
two accounts.36  These documents were subpoenaed by both the 
Treasury Department and the Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms Bureau 
and were to be used in a grand jury presentation to indict the defend-
ant.37  The bank, which received the subpoena, failed to provide no-
tice to the defendant that such information regarding his accounts was 
subpoenaed.38  Nevertheless, the bank proceeded with producing the 
documents that were requested.39 
In its opinion, the Court expressed that there was no intrusion 
into an area of privacy,40 and that it was not in agreement with the 
lower court’s ruling that the Fourth Amendment protected the bank 
 
31 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
32 Id. at 441. 
33 Id. at 440. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 436. 
36 Miller, 425 U.S. at 436. 
37 Id. at 437. 
38 Id. at 438. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 440. 
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records.41  The Court noted that unlike past instances where subpoe-
naed documents may have fallen within a zone of privacy, the bank 
records at issue in this case were not actually property of the individ-
ual defendant, but rather were property of the bank.42  The Court 
acknowledged that the defendant therefore could not claim ownership 
or possession of the bank records that were being subpoenaed by the 
Government.43 
B. Federal Precedent After Miller 
1. The Right to Financial Privacy Act 
In response to much criticism following the Court’s decision 
in Miller, a federal statute, the Right to Financial Privacy Act 
(“RFPA”), was passed and limited the holding of this seminal case.44  
While limiting the holding of Miller, the RFPA also provides addi-
tional rights with respect to an individual whose bank records have 
been subpoenaed that are not found in the Constitution.45  The RFPA 
provides statutory protection for individuals’ bank records in the 
form of notice of when their records have been subpoenaed,46 an op-
portunity to challenge the relevancy of any investigation involving 
their personal bank records,47 and provides recourse for any failure to 
follow specified procedures.48  Therefore, the RFPA created standing 
where the Constitution leaves bank customers with none, but it still 
allows for government access to financial records.49 
Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution 
to not provide any standing for individuals to challenge subpoenas is-
 
41 Miller, 425 U.S. at 440. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 State v. Shultz, 850 P.2d 818, 831 (Kan. 1993). 
45 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq. 
46 Id. at § 3405(2) (“A Government authority may obtain financial records under section 
3402(2) of this title pursuant to an administrative subpena [sic] or summons otherwise au-
thorized by law only if . . . (2) a copy of the subpena [sic] or summons has been served upon 
the customer or mailed to his last known address . . . with the following notice which shall 
state with reasonable specificity the nature of the law enforcement inquiry: ‘Records or in-
formation concerning your transactions held by the financial institution named in the at-
tached subpena [sic] or summons are being sought by this (agency or department) in accord-
ance with the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 . . . . ’ ”). 
47 Id. at § 3410. 
48 Id. 
49 Irani v. United States, 448 F.3d 507, 509-10 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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sued for their bank records, the RFPA has created grounds for indi-
viduals to challenge a subpoena.  Section 3410 of the RFPA provides 
specific measures for individuals to challenge subpoenas that have 
been issued for their financial records.50  To challenge any subpoena, 
the statute requires that there be an affidavit provided that states valid 
information necessary to make any opposition to a subpoena.51  First, 
it must be reported in the affidavit that the individual making the mo-
tion to quash the subpoena is a customer of the particular financial in-
stitution that the subpoena was issued to.52  Second, the affidavit must 
also contain the movant’s reasons to believe that the financial infor-
mation sought from the institution is not relevant to any type of in-
quiry.53  Alternatively, the movant may state in their affidavit that 
there has not been substantial compliance with the statutory provi-
sions outlined in the RFPA.54 
The RFPA limits how access can be obtained to financial rec-
ords held by institutions by making it clear that it only applies to per-
sonal bank records and not corporate bank records.55  Therefore, the 
statute defines a person as “an individual or a partnership of five or 
fewer individuals.”56  Regardless of how the records are accessed, all 
financial records must be reasonably described.57  Financial records 
may be obtained by customer authorization, “an administrative sub-
poena or summons,” a search warrant, a judicial subpoena, or “a for-
mal written request” that meets the requirements outlined by the stat-
ute.58  Any means of disclosure beyond the methods explicitly stated 
in the text of the RFPA are strictly prohibited.59 
Section 3404 of the statute gives customers of financial insti-
tutions the ability to authorize disclosure of their bank records to the 
 





55 See 12 U.S.C. § 3401(5). 
56 12 U.S.C. § 3401(4). 
57 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (“No Government authority may have access to or obtain copies of, or 
the information contained in the financial records of any customer from a financial institu-
tion unless the financial records are reasonably described.”). 
58 Id. 
59 12 U.S.C. § 3403(a) (“No financial institution . . . may provide to any Government au-
thority access to or copies of, or the information contained in, the financial records of any 
customer except in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.”). 
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Government.60  The procedure requires a customer of a financial in-
stitution to provide written authorization to both the financial institu-
tion and the government authority seeking the information in a signed 
and dated statement.61  The provisions of the statute give the custom-
er the right to revoke that authorization “at any time before the finan-
cial records are disclosed.”62  The RFPA outlines procedures for ob-
taining bank records by means of administrative subpoenas in section 
3405 and judicial subpoenas in section 3407.  In order to obtain the 
records there must be reasonable belief “that the records sought are 
relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.”63 
2. Case Law Interpretation of the RFPA 
In Hancock v. Marshall,64 the plaintiff filed a motion to quash 
an administrative subpoena that was issued by the Department of La-
bor for his financial records from First American National Bank.65  
The plaintiff moved to challenge the subpoena pursuant to the re-
quirements set out in section 3410 of the RFPA statute.66  The court 
denied plaintiff’s application to quash the subpoena on the grounds 
that the information sought was irrelevant.67  The plaintiff also made 
an argument to challenge the subpoena on the grounds that “consent 
might tend to deprive [him] of [his] rights . . . under the U.S. Consti-
tution.”68  The court held that this was not a valid argument for relief 
under the RFPA.69  The holding in Hancock is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller, which explicitly held that an in-
dividual has no constitutional rights with respect to his bank rec-
ords.70  Therefore, individuals can only make an argument to chal-
lenge any subpoenas for their bank records based on a statute, like the 
RFPA, and not on the Constitution itself.71 
 
60 12 U.S.C. § 3404. 
61 Id. 
62 12 U.S.C. § 3404(2). 
63 12 U.S.C. § 3405(1). 
64 86 F.R.D. 209 (D.D.C. 1980). 
65 Id. at 210. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 211. 
68 Id. 
69 Marshall, 86 F.R.D. at 211. 
70 Miller, 425 U.S. at 445. 
71 Marshall, 86 F.R.D. at 211. 
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The Third Circuit in Chao v. Community Trust Co.72 stated, 
“The RFPA was enacted by Congress ‘to protect the customers of fi-
nancial institutions from unwarranted intrusion into their records 
while at the same time permitting legitimate law enforcement activi-
ty.’ ” 73  The Third Circuit went on to note how the RFPA “strike[s] a 
balance between the right of privacy of customers and the need for 
law enforcement agencies to obtain financial records as part of legit-
imate investigations.”74  The court in Chao also explained how the 
RFPA states that unless a statutory exception applies, the government 
cannot obtain the financial records of a customer of a financial insti-
tution unless the records are “reasonably described and . . . are dis-
closed in response to an administrative subpoena or summons.”75 
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Kington76 has also held 
that individuals do not have a Fourth Amendment interest in their 
bank records.77  Kington involved a defendant who was formerly 
president of a now defunct bank.78  In his criminal conviction he 
faced numerous charges that included “embezzlement, falsifying a 
loan application[,] . . . filing a false income tax return,” and many 
others.79  Prior to his indictment, the grand jury issued a subpoena for 
defendant’s bank records.80  The defendant challenged this subpoena, 
but the court ultimately held that “while it is evident that Congress 
has expanded individuals’ right to privacy in bank records of their 
accounts, appellees are mistaken in their contention that the expan-
sion is of constitutional dimensions.”81  Therefore, the Fifth Circuit 
followed federal precedent in finding that “the rights created by Con-
gress are statutory, not constitutional.”82 
The Third Circuit has held that the RFPA does not apply to 
investigations conducted by state officials; in Wright v. Liguori,83 the 
appellant challenged the lower court’s dismissal of his complaint 
 
72 474 F.3d 75 (3d Cir. 2007). 
73 Id. at 80. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 3401(5)). 
76 801 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1986). 
77 Id. at 737. 
78 Id. at 734. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Kington, 801 F.2d at 737. 
82 Id. 
83 445 F. App’x 469 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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against Wachovia bank.84  Wright alleged that Wachovia wrongfully 
disclosed his financial records and violated the RFPA.85  However, 
the court held that the records were disclosed to a Delaware state de-
tective, and thus the protections of the RFPA were not implicated.86  
The court noted that the “RFPA limits the definition of ‘Government 
authority’ to any ‘agency or department of the United States, or any 
officer, employee or agent thereof.’ ”87  Since the court found that the 
information here was disclosed to a state official,” it found accord-
ingly that “the RFPA does not apply.”88 
It follows from the holding in Wright that the protections af-
forded by the federal RFPA do not protect individuals involved in in-
vestigations conducted by the State, such as Lomma.  In addition to 
the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the RFPA in Wright, the legisla-
tive history of the RFPA provides insight that the statute was not in-
tended to affect state governments in any way.89  “It is important to 
note that the scope of this title is limited to officials of federal agen-
cies and departments and to employees of the United States.  This 
limitation reflects our belief that legislation affecting state and local 
governments is the proper province of the respective state govern-
ments.”90 
3. Subpoenas for Bank Records from Foreign 
Bank Accounts 
In United States v. Mann,91 the Ninth Circuit extended the 
holding of Miller to include subpoenas for records from foreign bank 
accounts.92  In Mann, appellant Mann and his wife were indicted on 
eight counts.93  Those charges included income tax evasion, filing of 
false income tax returns, and failure to disclose foreign financial in-
terests.94  All of these charges arose from funds that were held in ap-
 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 470. 
86 Id. at 470-71. 
87 Id. at 471. 
88 Wright, 445 F.App’x at 471. 
89 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 247 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9306. 
90 Id. 
91 829 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1987). 
92 Id. at 851. 
93 Id. at 850. 
94 Id. 
10
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pellant’s bank account at Barclays, which was located in the Grand 
Cayman Island.95  At trial, appellant moved to suppress the evidence 
of these records that were obtained from the Barclays account.96  Ap-
pellant based his argument on the theory that because Cayman law 
protected an individual’s bank records from being disclosed,97 this re-
striction would create a Fourth Amendment privacy interest.98  There-
fore, Mann believed that because he had a Fourth Amendment inter-
est in his bank records, he had standing to challenge the subpoena.99 
The Ninth Circuit in Mann based its reasoning on an earlier 
Supreme Court decision, United States v. Payner.100  In Payner, the 
defendant argued that Bahamian law created an expectation of priva-
cy with respect to his bank records.101  The defendant in Payner ar-
gued that the decision in Miller did not apply because the bank rec-
ords were in the Bahamas and Bahamian law thus applied.102  The 
Court in Payner carefully explained how an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment rights are violated when his own “legitimate expectation 
of privacy” is invaded.103  An individual’s Fourth Amendment rights 
are not violated if the rights of a third party are violated.104  The Su-
preme Court concluded in Payner that the defendant lacked an expec-
tation of privacy even though Bahamian law created an expectation 
of privacy by means of a statute with respect to bank records.105  The 
Court reasoned that the Bahamian statute is hardly a blanket guaran-
tee of privacy.106  When discussing the Bahamian statute, the Court 
stated: 
Its application is limited; it is hedged with exceptions; 
and we have been directed to no authority construing 
its terms.  Moreover, American depositors know that 
their own country requires them to report relationships 
with foreign financial institutions.  We conclude that 
 
95 Id. 
96 Mann, 829 F.2d at 850. 
97 Id. at 851. 
98 Id. at 851-52. 
99 Id. at 852. 
100 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
101 Id. at 732 n.4. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 731 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)). 
104 Id. at 735. 
105 Payner, 447 U.S. at 732 n.4. 
106 Id. 
11
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[the defendant] lacked a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the [Bahamian bank] records that documented 
his account.107 
The statute in Mann was similar to the statute in Payner, so 
the court in Mann used the same reasoning as the Supreme Court in 
Payner.108  The Cayman Islands statute provided holders of bank ac-
counts with a privilege against disclosure.109  However, the statute 
was subject to many exceptions, and the existence of these exceptions 
puts a bank holder on notice that his or her records could be dis-
closed.110  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit in Mann held that the Cayman 
Islands statute was irrelevant and therefore appellant was afforded no 
additional protection under the Fourth Amendment.111 
IV. NEW YORK STATE PRECEDENT 
The court in Lomma also analyzed many state law cases in 
reaching its conclusion.112  In Matter of John Doe Corp I v. 
Blumenkopf,113 respondent, the Organized Crime Task Force, pre-
sented evidence to a grand jury for alleged misappropriation of trade 
secrets and commercial bribery involving petitioner who was the 
owner of two corporations.114  The court dismissed respondent’s peti-
tion to prohibit the presentation of evidence of his bank records that 
were obtained through an office subpoena duces tecum.115  The court 
stated that there is “no legally cognizable interest in the records of a 
third party bank and, hence, [the petitioners] lack standing to com-
plain of any illegality in subpoenaing them.”116  The court then made 
clear that petitioners in similar cases could not even attempt to make 
a valid argument to suppress any evidence of bank records because 
they have no legally recognized interest in them.117 
 
107 Id. 
108 Mann, 829 F.2d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 1987). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 852. 
111 Id. at 853. 
112 937 N.Y.S.2d 833, 839-40 (Sup. Ct. 2012). 
113 505 N.Y.S.2d 225 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1986). 
114 Id. at 226. 
115 Id. at 228. 
116 Id. at 227. 
117 Blumenkopf, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 227 (“The case law is equally clear, however, that peti-
tioners have no legally cognizable interest in the records of a third-party bank and, hence, 
12
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The First Department noted that whether a defendant has the 
“power to move to quash” a subpoena for his or her bank records is a 
necessary determination that must be established before any motion 
to quash is addressed.  In People v. Doe,118 the court reversed the 
lower court’s quashing of a grand jury subpoena to obtain bank rec-
ords and denied defendant’s motion to quash.119  The District Attor-
ney in this case actively opposed defendant’s motion to quash, argu-
ing that the defendant lacked standing because the individual did not 
have a possessory interest in the bank records.120  The defendant in 
Doe argued in his motion that the records were irrelevant in regards 
to the grand jury’s investigation.121  The court in Doe reasoned that 
before a court can determine the merits of a defendant’s motion to 
quash a subpoena, it is “critical” that the moving party has standing 
to do so.122  In answering the question of whether a defendant has 
standing, the court reaffirmed the holding of Miller and stated, 
“[B]ank records, although they may reflect transactions between the 
bank and its customers, belong to the bank.”123  Therefore, they noted 
that bank customers, like the defendant in Lomma, have “no proprie-
tary or possessory interests” in their personal bank records.124  The 
court in Doe held that because standing must be assessed before the 
merits of any motion, they would not even assess the arguments 
raised by the defendant in his motion to quash the subpoena for his 
bank records because defendant did not have the power to challenge 
the subpoena.125 
Courts have also held that defendants do not have standing 
when attempting to claim an error in their conviction based on the in-
troduction of subpoenaed bank records.  In People v. Crispino,126 the 
defendant, Domenick Crispino, was convicted of several charges in-
cluding grand larceny and criminal possession of forged instru-
ments.127  After defendant’s conviction, he was sentenced to five to 
 
they lack standing to complain of any illegality in subpoenaing them.”). 
118 467 N.Y.S.2d 45 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1983). 
119 Id. at 46. 
120 Id. at 45. 
121 Id. at 46. 
122 Id. at 45-46. 
123 Doe, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 46. 
124 Id. 
125 Id.  
126 748 N.Y.S.2d 718 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2002). 
127 Id. at 719. 
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fifteen years in prison.128  The defendant was unsuccessful in trying 
to challenge his conviction by arguing that a trial error had oc-
curred.129  The defendant stated that the “prosecution abused the 
grand jury process in subpoenaing his bank records after an indict-
ment had already been voted.”130  The bank records, the defendant 
felt, should not have been introduced at trial.131  The court stated, “As 
a threshold matter, defendant has no standing to challenge the bank’s 
production of its own records, because defendant, as a customer, has 
no proprietary interest in the records.”132  This case reaffirmed New 
York State’s traditional approach to the issue of standing with respect 
to bank records. 
Much of the court’s decision in Lomma was based on In re 
Norkin v. Hoey.133  In re Norkin laid the foundation on the issue of 
standing regarding challenging subpoenas for bank records in New 
York State.  The key difference of the In re Norkin case and the 
Lomma case is that In re Norkin involved a subpoena seeking records 
concerning a loan from a bank to a corporation,134 whereas in Lomma 
it was a subpoena for the defendant’s personal bank records.135 
The court in In re Norkin relied heavily on federal precedent 
found in the Miller case.136  The court was mindful of the fact that 
although the federal government and many states have passed indi-
vidual statutes that expand or limit the holding of Miller, New York 





131 Crispino, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 719. 
132 Id. 
133 586 N.Y.S.2d 926 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1992). 
134 Lomma, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 840. 
135 Compare In re Norkin 586 N.Y.S.2d at 931 (holding that petitioners did not have a 
recognizable confidentiality interest in the records sought by respondent because there is no 
such expectation of confidentiality in the context of the debtor-creditor loan relationship and 
therefore, petitioners did not have standing to challenge the subpoena issued to the bank for 
their records.), with Lomma, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 834 (holding that defendants have no standing 
to move to quash a subpoena issued for personal bank records in connection with an ongoing 
criminal case). 
136 See In re Norkin, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 929 (discussing the holding in Miller and the reac-
tion by the Federal Government to the decision). 
137 Id. at 928 (“The Legislature of this State has not acted to provide for any privacy rights 
in such records, and our courts have, in the main, followed United States v. Miller, in hold-
ing that bank customers have no proprietary interest in the records kept by the banks with 
which they do business.”). 
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on the law, at the same time there is much criticism because of the 
nature of the two different types of information that were being sub-
poenaed. 
In addition to prosecutors who issue subpoenas for bank rec-
ords in connection with criminal proceedings, many government 
agencies are also authorized to conduct such investigations.  The case 
of Matter of Congregation B’Nai Jonah v. Kuriansky138 involved a 
petitioner’s motion to quash a subpoena from respondent, the Deputy 
Attorney General, for Medicaid fraud control.139  The subpoena was 
addressed to the Manhattan Savings Bank and directed the bank to 
produce petitioner’s bank records for a four-year period.140  In re-
sponse to the subpoena, the petitioner moved to quash the evi-
dence.141  This motion was denied because the defendant lacked 
standing to challenge the subpoena.142  The court held that “it is a set-
tled principle that a bank customer ‘has no proprietary or possessory 
interest in bank records.’ ”143 
Defendants in criminal cases have also sought to challenge 
subpoenas for their bank records by arguing that being forced to hand 
over evidence of their personal bank records violates their Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.  The Fifth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution states that no individual shall be 
“compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”144  
The New York Court of Appeals has held that a subpoena duces 
tecum issued to obtain the bank records of an individual cannot be 
considered a denial of an individual’s right against self-
incrimination.145  In Carpetta v. Santucci,146 the petitioner was a 
school custodian and received a subpoena ordering him to appear be-
fore the grand jury with his and his wife’s personal bank records.147  
 
138 576 N.Y.S.2d 934 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1991). 
139 Id. at 935.  In the lower court, the petitioner’s motion to quash the subpoena for his 
bank records was denied “because of lack of standing.”  Id.  In this case, the petitioner is ap-
pealing that determination by the lower court.  Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Kuriansky, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 935. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. (quoting People v. Doe, 467 N.Y.S.2d 45, 46 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1983)). 
144 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
145 See Carpetta v. Santucci, 42 N.Y.2d 1066, 1067 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that a subpoena 
deuces tecum issued to obtain bank records of an individual cannot be considered a denial of 
an individual’s right against self-incrimination). 
146 42 N.Y.2d 1066 (N.Y. 1977). 
147 Id. at 1067. 
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The petitioner filed a motion to quash the subpoena on the grounds 
that it was an unconstitutional search and seizure and a “denial of pe-
titioner’s privilege against self incrimination.”148  The Court of Ap-
peals held that because bank records are property of the bank and not 
personal property of the petitioner, ordering a subpoena to produce 
those records is not an unconstitutional act of self-incrimination.149 
The Supreme Court of Nassau County addressed the extent 
that a bank has a legal duty to protect a depositor’s information from 
disclosure in response to a subpoena in connection with judicial pro-
ceedings.  In Daniels v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,150 the plaintiff sued 
the bank where she had several accounts after the bank responded to 
a judicial subpoena for her records.151  The court recognized that New 
York case law has held that there is no fiduciary relationship between 
a depositor and a bank that would make a bank liable for disclosing 
confidential records to a third party.152  The court went on to note that 
absent this fiduciary duty, the standard that should be applied in this 
case is the Miller holding.153  The court made mention that there have 
been a few New York courts which have implied that a depositor has 
standing to object to a subpoena for bank records in “wholly civil 
proceedings between private parties.”154  While the defendant in 
Lomma relied on Daniels to support his motion to quash, that case is 
clearly distinguishable because it was a civil case.  Additionally, the 
Daniels court ultimately held that “a depositor’s standing to chal-
lenge a subpoena seeking third-party bank records, and accordingly, 
the existence of an underlying privacy interest in those records, has 
not been affirmatively declared in this state.”155  Therefore, as the 
court in Lomma determined, since this is a criminal proceeding there 
is no right to privacy with respect to defendant’s bank records. 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Lomma decision will likely influence New York to estab-
lish greater privacy protections for individuals’ bank records.  A New 
 
148 Id.  
149 Id. 
150 No. 22575/09, 2011 WL 4443599, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 22, 2011). 




155 Daniels, 2011 WL 4443599 at *1. 
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York statute similar to the federal statute will help make customers of 
financial institutions feel a sense of protection when it comes to their 
personal financial records.156  As the Lomma court also noted, such a 
statute would make sure that government authorities are not abusing 
their power to issue subpoenas for bank records.157  However, given 
the fact that federal legislatures have explicitly left the duty to states 
to find similar statutes to the RFPA,158 the New York legislature has 
the burden of imposing such a law.  In doing so, New York legisla-
tures should look to the RFPA and how other states have adopted 
similar statutes.  Additionally, many states have found a source of 
protection for individuals’ personal bank records in their state consti-
tutions.  In the past, New York has found that its constitution, though 
strikingly similar to the United States Constitution, affords individu-
als greater protections with respect to certain rights.159  By following 
other states that have found that their constitutions grant individuals 
greater privacy protection than the United States Constitution does, 
New York would be giving individuals a fundamental privacy right 
with respect to their banking records. 
Although the United States Supreme Court has held that an 
individual does not have a Fourth Amendment right with respect to 
an individual’s personal bank records,160 several state courts have 
found that similar provisions of their state constitutions grant such a 
right.  Thus, a Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
v. DeJohn161 found that “Miller establishes a dangerous precedent, 
with great potential for abuse,”162 and in doing so it “decline[d] to 
follow that case when construing the state constitutional protec-
tion.”163  Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article I, Section 8,164 
 
156 See 12 U.S.C § 3401 et seq. 
157 Lomma, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 843. 
158 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, supra note 89, at 247-48 (“We believe that grave constitu-
tional and political issue would have been raised if this title had applied to other levels of 
government.  Several states, most notably California, have enacted Financial Privacy Stat-
utes of their own.  This is a movement which deserves both our support and our forbear-
ance.”). 
159 See, e.g., Islip v. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 574 (N.Y. 1989) (“This court has repeatedly 
stated that New York State offers greater freedom of speech guarantees under our State Con-
stitution than the minimal protection afforded individuals under the Federal Constitution.”). 
160 Miller, 425 U.S. at 445. 
161 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979). 
162 Id. at 1289. 
163 Id. 
164 See PA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
17
Brancato: Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
1258 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
which is very similar to the language of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, the court held that unlike the federal Con-
stitution, their state provision granted an individual the right to priva-
cy with respect to his bank records.165  Similarly, the state of Utah, 
which also has a state constitution provision that mirrors the language 
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, has held 
that under the state constitution bank customers have the right of pri-
vacy in bank records.166  Additionally, New Jersey has recognized 
that under its constitution an individual has an expectation of privacy 
in his or her bank records as well.167  New Jersey has found that a 
greater protection exists even despite the fact that both the federal 
and New Jersey constitutions have “nearly identical provisions.”168  
Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that “ ‘when the United 
States Constitution affords our citizens less protection than does the 
New Jersey Constitution, we have not merely the authority to give 
full effect to the State protection, we have the duty to do so.’ ”169 
The State of New York should look to follow what other 
states across the nation have done in construing their state constitu-
tions to afford individuals a right to privacy with respect to their per-
sonal bank records.  As Justice Brennan once noted, affording indi-
viduals more protections under their state constitutions, even where 
the language used is identical to that of the United States Constitu-
tion, is fundamental to the concept of federalism.170  Justice Brennan 
urged that state courts take initiative to decipher the meanings of their 
own constitution, even where they use the exact same language as the 
federal constitution.171  For example, New York’s equivalent provi-
 
and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place 
or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor 
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed by the affiant.”). 
165 DeJohn, 403 A.2d at 1289. 
166 See UT. CONST. art. I, § 14 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; 
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.”). 
167 State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d 866 (N.J. 2005). 
168 Id. at 873. 
169 Id. (quoting State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 800 (N.J. 1990)). 
170 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977). 
171 Id. at 499-500 (“State courts have independently considered the merits of constitutional 
arguments and declined to follow opinions of the United States Supreme Court they find un-
convincing, even when the state and federal constitutions are similarly or identically 
phrased.”). 
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sion to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is 
found in Article I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution.  
Given the fact that the United States Supreme Court has found that an 
individual has no Fourth Amendment interest in their bank records in 
United States v. Miller,172 New York has seemed to base its reasoning 
in denying individuals a right to privacy for their bank records on this 
decision.173  However, Justice Brennan’s theory would urge New 
York to reconsider the merits of the Court’s reasoning based on the 
New York Constitution.  One example Justice Brennan acknowl-
edged was the California Supreme Court’s holding that under the 
California State Constitution, bank depositors have a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy with respect to their bank records.174  This pro-
cess of state courts scrutinizing decisions of federal courts and inter-
preting their own constitutions even where they are strikingly similar 
to the federal Constitution, Justice Brennan argued, is what is neces-
sary to afford individuals the protections they deserve.175  Further-
more, Justice Brennan argued that this protection is what the framers 
of the Constitution intended for individuals.176  Therefore, following 
Justice Brennan’s theory and other state courts that have found that 
individuals have a greater protection under their state constitutions 
with respect to privacy and their personal bank records, New York 
should revisit this issue and alter its interpretation of Article I, Sec-
tion 12 of the New York State Constitution. 
Should New York not find that its state constitution affords an 
individual an expectation of privacy with respect to bank records, it 
should still look to adopt a statute similar to the RFPA.  Following 
the decision in Miller, the United States adopted this statute to com-
pensate for an individual’s lack of constitutional protections under 
the Fourth Amendment with respect to their bank records.177  Other 
 
172 Miller, 425 U.S. at 445. 
173 Lomma, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 839. 
174 Brennan, supra note 170, at 501. 
175 See id. at 503 (“With federal scrutiny diminished, state courts must respond by increas-
ing their own.”). 
176 See id. (“Federalism need not be a mean-spirited doctrine that serves only to limit the 
scope of human liberty.  Rather, it must necessarily be furthered significantly when state 
courts thrust themselves into a position of prominence in the struggle to protect the people of 
our nation from governmental intrusions on their freedoms.   We can confidently conjecture 
that James Madison, Father of the Bill of Rights, would have approved.”). 
177
 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, supra note 89, at 28 (“While the Supreme Court found no 
constitutional right of privacy in financial records, it is clear that Congress may provide pro-
tection in individual rights beyond that afforded in the Constitution.”). 
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states have also passed statutes similar to the RFPA.  For example, 
California passed a statute, the California Right to Financial Privacy 
Act,178 which affords an individual privacy with respect to their bank 
records. 
A statute such as the RFPA is important because it imposes 
limits on the Government’s access to an individual’s personal bank 
records.179  The Court in Irani v. U.S.180 stated the RFPA was “ ‘in-
tended to protect the customers of financial institutions from unwar-
ranted intrusion into their records while at the same time permitting 
legitimate enforcement activity.’ ”181  The government may be per-
mitted to access an individual’s personal bank records, however, the 
government should not have unlimited access to these records. 
A statute similar to the RFPA would allow for substantial pri-
vacy rights while still preventing individuals from objecting to a sub-
poena only to frustrate the government’s investigation.182  New York, 
and states which have not enacted a statute similar to the RFPA, can-
not simply allow the government to casually seek an individual’s per-
sonal bank records without allowing that individual to have an oppor-
tunity to challenge the subpoena.  Such a statute should allow an 
individual to challenge a subpoena by specific measures.  Thus a 
statute that affords an individual some protection from the govern-
ment obtaining the sensitive information in his bank records would 
strike a balance between the needs of the government and the rights 
of the people against unwarranted intrusions into private matters. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Most people in New York believe that when they disclose 
their information to banks that it will remain confidential.  However, 
unbeknownst to many New Yorkers, the New York courts have failed 
to recognize any constitutional right individuals have in protecting 
their personal financial records.183  Furthermore, state legislatures 
have not adopted any statutes to limit the power of the government in 
accessing these personal records.  As the Lomma court suggested, 
 
178 CAL. GOV. CODE § 7470 (2012). 
179 Irani v. United States, 448 F.3d 507, 509-10 (2d Cir. 2006). 
180 448 F.3d 507 (2d Cir. 2006). 
181 Id. at 510 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 247). 
182 Id. 
183 Lomma, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 842-43. 
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“[I]n the view of this court, a party, whether in a civil or a criminal 
proceeding, should have a right to move to quash a subpoena duces 
tecum issued to a third-party bank for his personal banking rec-
ords.”184  Irrespective of the court’s belief, it was still bound to follow 
state precedent, noting that “the law effectively provides no clear 
right for those privacy interests to even be asserted, much less recog-
nized.”185  The Lomma court has even noted that although federal 
courts have created a statute to provide individuals with protection 
regarding their personal bank affairs, that “no similar protection ex-
ists under New York State law.”186  For these reasons, the Lomma 
court held that the defendant had no standing to challenge a subpoena 
for his personal bank records.  Either the New York Legislature or 
the New York Court of Appeals should take effective measures to 
change this inadequacy of the law and grant an individual a right to 







184 Id. at 841. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 842. 
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